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A b s t r a c t
A satisfactory complete normative criterion for individualistic ethical decision­
making under uncertainty such as Harsanyi’s (Journal of Political Economy, 1955) 
requires a single fundamental utility function for all individuals which is fully in- 
terpersonally comparable. The paper discusses reasons why interpersonal com­
parisons of utility (ICU ’s) have been eschewed in the past and argues that most 
existing approaches, both empirical and ethical, to IC U ’s are flawed. Either they 
confound facts with values, or they are based on unrealistic hypothetical decisions 
in an “original position” . Instead ICU’s need to be recognized for what they really 





















































































































































































I N T E R P E R S O N A L  C O M P A R I S O N S  O F  U T I L I T Y
. . .  I still believe that it is helpful to speak as if  inter-personal comparisons o f  utility rest 
upon scientific foundations —  that is, upon observation or introspection. . . .  I still think, 
when I make interpersonal comparisons . . .  that my judgments are more like judgments o f  
value than judgments o f  verifiable fact. Nevertheless, to those o f  my friends who think 
differently, I would urge that, in practice, our difference is not very important. They think 
that propositions based upon the assumption o f  equality are essentially part o f  economic 
science. I think that the assumption o f  equality comes from outside, and that its justification 
is more ethical than scientific. But we all agree that it is fitting that such assumptions should 
be made and their implications explored with the aid o f  the economist’s technique.
— Robbins (1938, pp. 640-641)
1. Introduction
1 .1 .  B a c k g r o u n d
Personal ethics should be about living a good life (cf. Williams, 1985), ethics 
in public policy about making good public decisions, and ethics in economics about 
choosing economic policies which improve the allocation of resources. This brings 
ethics very close to normative decision theory. Indeed, ethics may even become, 
at one and the same time, both an application and an ideal form of that theory.
Many approaches to ethical decision making have received the attention of 
moral philosophers and practical people. In my view none is as satisfactory as 
an idealized form of utilitarianism based upon an ethical concept of utility. In­
deed, if one takes an individualistic view of ethics, then utilitarianism can be made 
virtually tautologous by defining an individual’s utility function as that whose ex­
pected value ought to be maximized in all the personal matters which affect that 
individual alone. W hat is more, utilitarianism itself can be derived from the even 
more primitive normative principle called “consequentialism” . This last principle 
(Hammond, 1986, 1988a, 1988b) requires that a prescribed norm of behaviour 
should be explicable solely by its consequences. That is, a “consequentialist” be­
haviour norm must reveal a “consequence choice function” according to which the 
consequences of behaviour are chosen from the feasible set of consequences in any 
decision tree. When the space of consequences is defined broadly enough to accom­




























































































(cf. Sen, 1987a, p. 40, note 13). Under the conditions spelled out in Hammond 
(1987a, 1988c) it also implies an idealized form of Harsanyi utilitarianism, based 
on a single and fully interpersonal comparable “fundamental” utility function for 
all possible types of individual.
This leaves us with the difficulty of constructing the interpersonally compa­
rable fundamental utility function. Indeed, for many years this has usually been 
seen as the main problem with Harsanyi utilitarianism in particular. The same is 
true of Rawlsian maximin, of course, and more generally with the construction of 
any suitable Bergson social welfare function for use in welfare economics.
Many problems have been created in social choice theory and in welfare eco­
nomics by the extreme reluctance to mak ■ any kind of interpersonal comparison 
of utility (or ICU). The main exception has been the almost certainly unethical 
comparisons that result from weighing all individuals’ dollars equally. Such com­
parisons emerge implicitly when the “Kaldor-Hicks” compensation principle (actu­
ally due to Pareto (1894, 1895) and Barone (1908), as explained by Chipman and 
Moore (1978) and Chipman (1987)) is applied without any actual compensation 
occurring. They are quite explicit in the aggregate wealth criterion advocated by 
Strotz (1958, 1961), Harberger (1971) and Posner (1981), and criticized by Fisher 
and Rothenberg (1961) and by Hammond (1982a). Goldstick (1971) suggested 
valuing the dollars of those with equal wealth equally, but did not suggest how to 
compare the dollars of those whose wealth differs.
So great was the reluctance to consider other interpersonal comparisons that 
it took almost twenty years after the publication of the first edition of Arrow’s 
Social Choice and Individual Values before Sen (1970a, b) and others started a 
systematic study of the implications of relaxing Arrow’s most restrictive assump­
tion —  namely, the total avoidance of all ICU’s in his definition of a “social welfare 
function.” It is true that “independence of irrelevant alternatives” is formulated 
in a way which excludes interpersonal comparisons (Hildreth, 1953). Nevertheless, 
it is really the definition of a social welfare function which makes this exclusion 




























































































1 .2 .  C o v e r a g e
This paper presents an incomplete yet still quite long survey of that part 
of the literature on ICU’s which seems most relevant to social choice theory and 
welfare economics. One example of an entirely different approach which I shall 
not discuss is Wittman (1974) and Nozick’s (1985, pp. 166-167) suggestion for 
using ICU’s in criminology in order to compare offenders’ punishments with their 
victims losses, so that sufficient retribution can be exacted.
Nor shall I say much about Shapley’s (1969) ingenious proposal, lucidly ex­
plained as well as extended by Yaari (1981), and also expounded by Brock (1978b, 
1979a, 1980). Shapley suggested constructing a cooperative game of transferable 
A-weighted utility, and determining a weight A* for each individual i so that the 
utility distribution which emerges in this artificial cooperative game is a feasible 
distribution in the original game. Yaari’s theory only applies when there is a con­
vex set of possible social states. And in applications such as Aumann and Kurz 
(1977), the theory also presumes the kind of lump-sum redistribution which, as I 
have argued in Hammond (1979a, 1987b), is generally “incentive incompatible,” 
so not truly feasible. Nevertheless, d’Aspremont (1988) has begun work on ex­
tending the idea to Bayesian incentive compatible procedures. See also Keeney 
and Kirkwood (1975) for related work, and particularly Roth (1980, 1986), Shafer 
(1980), Scafuri and Yannelis (1984), Aumann (1985, 1986, 1987) for an intense 
debate on the significance of the fact that such “NTU value allocations” are often 
asymmetric.
Another common use of ICU’s has been in bargaining theory. Works such 
as Kalai (1977), Myerson (1977), Neilsen (1983), Kalai and Samet (1985), Bovens 
(1987) can be consulted in this connection. In effect, bargaining problems represent 
a very special kind of social decision tree in which a great deal of redistribution is 
possible. In this and other work, I have chosen to concentrate on social decision 
procedures which in principle can be applied to a much broader domain of social 
decision trees.




























































































conflicting interpersonal comparisons without either imposition or dictatorship. 
Arrow mentioned this in his oral discussion of Phelps (1977), and there is some 
published discussion in Kelly (1978) and Pazner (1979). It has remained a com­
paratively neglected area. This is in contrast to the very extensive work on “social 
welfare functionals” (SW F L ’s) embodying utility information that reflects inter­
personal comparisons. I shall have very little to say about S W F L ’s for two reasons. 
One is that d’Aspremont (1985) and Sen (1986) have both conducted extensive 
surveys quite recently. More seriously, however, this literature has never explained 
precisely where this additional utility information comes from, and that will be 
my main concern here.
1 .3 .  O u t l i n e
After this introduction, Section 2 briefly discusses some of the history be­
hind the general reluctance of economists to make ICU’s, as well as the impasse 
which this creates in both welfare economics and social choice theory. Next, Sec­
tion 3 considers what different forms IC U ’s may take and distinguishes between 
interpersonal comparisons of utility levels, and interpersonal comparisons of util­
ity differences. Thereafter Sections 4 and 5 proceed to consider what alternative 
methods for making such ICU’s have been suggested. Section 4 considers the 
“impersonal” preferences which emerge when individuals are in the hypothetical 
original position of either Harsanyi or Rawls. Section 5 examines suggestions for 
inferring interpersonal comparisons from different aspects of individuals’ actual 
behaviour. It seems, however, that such “behaviourist” empirical methods are 
fundamentally unsatisfactory. I believe this is because ethically relevant ICU’s are 
tantamount to normative statements and so cannot be derived just from empiri­
cal observation. So finally, in Section 6, a number of explicitly ethical methods of 
making interpersonal comparisons are considered. In particular, a procedure is put 
forward for deriving “decision-theoretic” ICU’s from a general framework for eth­
ical decision-making, and for integrating such comparisons within that framework 





























































































2. Social Choice without Interpersonal Comparisons o f  Utility
2 .1 .  L o g i c a l  P o s i t i v i s m
In the 1930’s, the philosophical doctrine of logical positivism was imported
to England from Vienna. Primarily responsible for this, perhaps, was Sir Alfred
Ayer, whose Language, Truth and Logic was published in 1936. There he wrote:
We can now see why it is impossible to find a criterion for determining the validity o f  
ethical judgements. It is not because they have an ‘ absolute' validity which is mysteriously 
independent o f  ordinary sense-experience, but because they have no objective validity 
whatsoever . . .  They arc pure expressions o f  feeling and as such do not come under the 
category o f  truth and falsehood. They are unverifiable for the same reason as a cry o f  pain 
or a word o f  command is unverifiable [as a statement] —  because they do not express 
genuine propositions.
— Ayer (1936, 1971), p. 144.
As he remarks in Magee (1971), Ayer himself regarded logical positivism as “a 
blending of the extreme empiricism of Hume with the modern logical techniques 
developed by people like Bertrand Russell.” Even before this, however, in 1932 
when Ayer was still only 22, Robbins —  perhaps influenced by the Vienna Circle, 
perhaps not —  had published his Essays on the Nature and Significance of Eco­
nomic Science. The logical positivists saw all ethical statements as “unverifiable” 
(see Ayer’s conversation in Magee, 1971, p.49) —  in fact, as just so much noise or 
exhaust. Actually, Ayer eventually withdrew somewhat from his extreme position
—  even in the introduction to the second edition of Language, Truth and Logic in 
1946 —  but we shall return to this later in Section 4. Meanwhile Robbins pointed 
out that ICU’s —  at least those of the kind which were used to argue for equal­
ity —  were also ethical statements of a particular kind which had no scientific 
foundation. Indeed, Jevons had made a similar claim earlier:
The reader will find again, that there is never, in any single instance, an attempt to compare 
the amount o f  feeling in one mind with that in another. I see no means by which such 
comparison can be accomplished. The susceptibility o f  one mind may, for what we know, 
be a thousand times greater than that o f  another. But provided that the susceptibility was 
different in a like ratio in all directions, we should never be able to discover the difference.
Every mind is thus inscrutable to every other mind, and no common denominator o f  feeling 
seems to be possible . . .  the motive in one mind is weighed only against other motives in 
the same mind, never against the motives in other minds.




























































































Cooter and Rappoport (1984) discuss how Fisher (1892) saw that price theory 
reliés only on ordinal utility that is not interpersonally comparable. And Chipman 
and Moore (1978, p. 548, fn. 2) and Chipman (1987) discuss briefly how Pantaleoni 
and Barone had persuaded Pareto (1894, p. 58) to use the monetary interpersonal 
comparisons implicit in the compensation principles, before he turned to a general 
differential form of Bergson social welfare function in Pareto (1913) —  see also 
Bergson (1983).
2 .2 .  T h e  N e w  W e l f a r e  E c o n o m i c s
Following Robbins, it became fashionable for economists to eschew ICTJ’s, 
apparently in an attempt to be “scientific” . Positive economics, of course, could 
easily do without them, but even normative economists were swept up by the 
“new welfare economics” and insisted on limiting themselves to identifying Pareto 
efficient outcomes, or at least actual or potential Pareto improvements to the 
existing economic allocation. Without ICU’s they could do nothing else. Choosing 
one Pareto efficient social state over another requires trading off the gains of some 
individuals against the losses of others. Policy measures which alleviate extreme 
poverty may be highly desirable, but will not be Pareto improvements if they 
involve sacrifices by the rich. As Dobb (1969, p. 81) points out, this drastic 
weakness of welfare economics without ICU’s had been noted by Harrod (1938) 
just before the appearance of Robbins’ (1938) influential article. Yet the habit has 
persisted for many years. For instance Archibald (1959, 1965) forcefully advocated 
the view that welfare economists need not proceed beyond identifying changes 
which everybody desires. And where interpersonal comparisons really have to be 
made, because the gainers from a change were not going to compensate the losers, 
the monetary comparisons that result from valuing all individuals’ dollars equally 
still seem to be the most popular among economists, who then wonder why their 
policy advice does not receive wider acceptance.
On social choice theory without ICU’s there is also an enormous literature —  
see, for example, Sen’s (1986) recent survey. It is virtually impossible, however, to 




























































































economics (Sen, 1970a). Indeed, after Arrow’s original contribution, not much of 
this literature seems all that useful in retrospect. The reason is that most of it 
has tried to circumvent one or other of the conditions of Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem. Elsewhere (Hammond, 1986) I have offered what may seem to be a 
stronger “consequentialist” defence of these conditions than Arrow and various 
successors have offered. This suggests that the most important condition of the 
impossibility theorem is one which was not stated as a formal assumption, though 
it was clearly expressed as follows:
The viewpoint will be taken here that interpersonal comparison o f  utilities has no meaning 
and, in fact, there is no meaning relevant to welfare comparisons in the measurability o f  
individual utility.
—  A rrow  (1951, 1963, p. 9).
Indeed, Arrow’s theorem really is an “impossibility” rather than a “dictator­
ship” theorem because ultimately even the choice of the dictator requires interper­
sonal comparisons. And, of course, majority rule attempts to value all individuals’ 
preferences equally, which is another kind of interpersonal comparison.
3. The Forms o f  Interpersonal Comparisons
3 .1 .  I n t e r p e r s o n a l  C o m p a r i s o n s  o f  U t i l i t y  L e v e ls
Suppose there is a society of individuals i in the finite set N, each of whom 
has a utility function U'(-) which represents i's personal welfare ordering R‘ on the 
domain X  of social states. A  comparison of utility levels between two individuals 
i,j  6 N  is then simply a statement such as u ‘ > u3, where u ' and u3 are two 
particular levels of the utility functions U', U3 for persons i and j .
Thus, interpersonal comparions of utility levels (or ICUL’s) are simply ordi­
nary comparisons of real numbers. So far, we have not given them any significance, 
either empirical or ethical. Economists usually give individual utilities empirical 
significance by considering preferences. Thus the statement





























































































gives meaning to the ordering of the two utility levels U'(x) and U‘(y) for person 
i. But what axe we to make of the inequality U'(x) >  U3(y) when i 5̂  j?  Person 
i cannot choose to be person j  and person j  cannot choose to be person i. But 
person i can want to change places with person j ,  and vice versa, so we might 
interpret U‘(x) > U3(y) to mean that, if x is the social consequence, person i 
would rather not become person j  if y were then the resulting social consequence. 
Or we can interpret it to mean that, if y has occurred, person j  would rather be 
person i if x were to result. Alternatively, it might mean that a third person k 
would rather become person i in state x than person j  in state y.
Whatever their interpretation, it follows that such ICUL’s correspond to an 
interpersonal preference ordering R on the space X  x N, so that U'{x) >  U](y) if 
and only if (x,i) R (y , j ). Notice that, as in Suppes (1966), different individuals 
k in N  will usually have their own interpersonal orderings Rk on X  x N\ there is 
no guarantee that they will have the same estimate of what it means in welfare 
terms to be another person. Indeed, different individuals k can even have their 
own personal opinions of what constitutes the utilities of individuals i and j ,  so 
that we really need to write
(2) Uik(x )> U * k(y) « = *  (x ,i)R k (y,j)
where Utk(•), U^k(-) denote k's assessments of the utility functions of i and j 
respectively.
However, as both Harsanyi (1955) and Sen (1970a) discuss at some length, it 
is usual to assume that the different individuals k in N can at least agree on what 
constitutes the welfare orderings of person i and person j . It is not at all clear 
to me that this is a very good assumption, but it may be all right if we suppose 
that each individual i is closely consulted on what makes up his utility, and each 
other individual k uses this information. This is the axiom of identity. Then the 
interpersonal ordering of each individual k E N  must respect the welfare orderings 
of other individuals, so that, for all *, k, £ ,y , one has




























































































It follows that each U'k(x) =  </>ik[U'(x)], where <j>'k is an increasing transforma­
tion of i ’s personal utility function. The ICUL’s become comparisons of different 
individuals’ indifference curves. Nevertheless, in future the possible dependence of 
ICU’s on k will be ignored throughout.
The question of what it means to want to be another person has still not 
really been faced, however, as it must be if this approach to ICUL’s is to have 
proper empirical significance. I shall return to this later in Sections 4, 5 and 6. 
For the moment, assuming that ICUL’s do have ethical significance, we ask what 
kind of ethical significance are they likely to have.
If U’(x) >  U3(x), the presumption has generally been that an egalitarian, 
who will tend to favour equalizing utility levels if possible, will want to try to 
alter social state x somewhat in order to increase person j ’s utility, perhaps by a 
transfer of income from i to j,  even if this may mean lowering person i ’s utility 
(cf. Sen, 1973). How much the egalitarian is prepared to sacrifice i ’s utility in 
order to increase j ’s remains unclear, however. Indeed, if it is possible to increase 
i ’s utility a lot by moving away from state x, even though this means decreasing 
j ’s utility, a mild egalitarian may even be prepared to accept this inegalitarian 
change. O f course, these considerations really only make sense if intensities or 
differences in utility can be compared interpersonally, as well as levels.
An extreme egalitarian would presumably see U’(x) >  U3(x) as justifying 
any change which promoted j ’s welfare, even at the expense of i, provided it did 
not go so far as to make i even worse off than j  was in state x. In other words, if 
U'(x), U‘(y), and U3(y) all exceed U3(x), and if all other individuals are indifferent 
between x and y, then y should be socially preferred to x. This is exactly the equity 
axiom and the two-person leximin rule discussed in Hammond (1976a, 1979b) and 
Sen (1977). Under the conditions of unrestricted domain and independence of 
irrelevant alternatives, as well as Pareto indifference, it becomes equivalent to the 
leximin criterion of Sen (1970a). This form of extreme egalitarianism is also related 
to Strasnick’s (1976a, 1976b, 1977, 1979) idea of “preference priority.” Under this 




























































































we say that i’s preference for x over y takes priority over j 's preference for y over 
x if x P y when x P' y, y P3 x, and all other individuals are indifferent between x 
and y.
Such extreme egalitarianism is ethically unappealing because, when U’(x) is 
much bigger than U](x), it may prescribe very large sacrifices in i ’s welfare even 
when the gains to person j  are extremely small. Such arguments rest, however, 
on being able to compare i ’s losses with j 's gains, and this is a different kind of 
interpersonal comparison which I shall come to consider in a moment. It should 
be noted, however, that the ethical significance of ICUL’s on their own remains 
somewhat unclear in this framework, unless we do accept extreme egalitarianism 
and so Rawls’ difference principle. Of cou :se, ICUL’s do allow egalitarian alloca­
tions to be identified in economic models with a sufficiently rich feasible set from 
which to choose, as in Dworkin (1981), Roemer (1985), Cohen (1989), and other 
related bargaining models. They do not, however, tell us how to compare differ­
ent inegalitarian allocations, or even how to compare egalitarian allocations with 
inegalitarian ones.
3 .2 .  I n t e r p e r s o n a l  C o m p a r i s o n s  o f  U t i l i t y  U n i t s  o r  D i f f e r e n c e s
Interpersonal comparisons of utility differences (or ICUD’s) amount to com­
parisons of the form u\ — u'2 >  u\ — u2, where u\, u\ are two levels of person i ’s 
utility function, and u\, u2 are two levels of person j ’s utility function. W hat then 
is the empirical significance of a statement such as
(5) U\x) -  U\y) >  U3(w) -  Uj(z)?
Insofar as U’(x) — U'(y) measures the “preference intensity” of person i for x 
over y , and U](w) — U3(z) the “preference intensity” of person j  for w over z, 
this seems to be just a straightforward comparison of preference intensities. But 
what empirical significance do we attach to a person’s “preference intensity” , and 
on what empirical basis do we “compare” the preference intensities of different 
people? Some suggestions for answers to both these questions are discussed in 




























































































At its face value, (5) means something like preferring moving from state y to 
state x if one is person i to moving from state 2 to state w if one is person j.  This 
is hardly an operational preference, however. But suppose w =  y and 2 =  x, so 
that (5) becomes
(6) U\x) -  U\y) >  U\y) -  U’ (x).
This means that moving i from y to x is preferable to the reverse move of j  from 
x to y. It suggests that, if we are only considering what happens to persons i 
and j , then we should prefer x to y because i’s gain outweighs j ’s loss. As an 
empirical statement, this means very little indeed, but as an ethical statement, its 
immediate implications seem rather clear at first sight.
Even as an ethical statement, however, we may not always want to infer 
from (6) that x should be preferred to y if we take account only of persons i 
and j . Consider the following possibility, of the kind discussed by Sen (1973). 
Although U'(x) — U'(y) may be greater than U3(y) — U1(x), it may also be true 
that U'(x) >  U’(y) >  U’ (y) > U3(x) and that actually U'(y) may be very much 
greater than U3(y). Of course, this amounts to an ICUL. It suggests, however, 
that we should try to increase j ’s welfare on egalitarian grounds, even if this has 
to be done at the expense of i. Moving from x to y, as suggested on the basis of 
ICU D ’s, is therefore inegalitarian when one judges on the basis of ICUL’s.
W ith both types of comparison, one has “dual” comparisons of the kind con­
sidered in Hammond (1977), and there will usually be tensions between the ethical 
prescriptions suggested by the two different types of comparison. Such tensions 
seem hard to avoid in general social choice problems although, as shown in that 
paper, the two types of comparison could be reconciled sometimes when the prob­
lem is to choose a first-best optimal income distribution (in the absence of any 
incentive constraints). Basically, when both U’(x) — U'(y) > U3(y) — U3(x) and 
U'(x) >  U'(y) >  U3(y) >  U3(x), there has to be a judgment of whether the excess 
of i ’s gain over j ’s loss is more than enough to outweigh the inegalitarian results 




























































































resolve without a single coherent decision framework in which ICU’s can both be 
made and used in ethical decisions. For this reason I regret that the discussion of 
Hammond (1977, 1980) now seems largely irrelevant.
Having discussed the form of ICU’s, it is now time to consider their meaning.
4. Impersonality and Fundamental Preferences
In the first edition o f  Language., Truth and Logic I had maintained that propositions about 
oneself, one ’s own feelings, were to be taken at their face value, so that when I was 
talking about my own thoughts I was talking about thoughts, feelings and so on, but that 
propositions about the mental states o f  other people were propositions about their behaviour.
This was a fairly natural deduction from the principle o f  verifiability, but I came to see that 
it was wrong and in fact even inconsistent, that it could be shown to lead to a contradiction, 
and these two classes o f  propositions had to be taken symmetrically. And once you take the 
view that they have to be symmetrical then either you can treat yourself behaviouristically, 
which means, as Ogden and Richards once put it, feigning anaesthesia, or you can ascribe 
thoughts and feelings to others in the literal way in which one ascribes them to oneself.
— Aye r , in Magee (1971) pp . 54-5.
“Impersonality” is the term used by Harsanyi (1953b, 1955) to describe the 
idea that, in order to free oneself from an unduly selfish perspective in weighing 
moral issues, an ethical observer should pretend to be completely uncertain which 
individual he will become after the issue is decided. In this formulation of utili­
tarianism, therefore, individuals are meant to choose as though behind a “veil of 
ignorance” —  to borrow Rawls’ (1971) felicitous term —  uncertain what positions 
they will eventually occupy in the society being affected by the decisions under 
consideration. This Kantian idea is similar to Hare’s (1951, 1963) principle of 
“universalizability” , under which any person should only prescribe what he would 
still be willing to prescribe even if he were somebody else completely. And it is 
perhaps even close in spirit to what Rawls describes as “the original position” —  
see Rawls (1959, 1971).
Harsanyi and Rawls both use this concept of impersonality or the original po­
sition in order to arrive at alternative specific forms of social ordering. Harsanyi 
assumes that a person who acts as though he does not yet know who he is will 
be “Bayesian rational” and maximize the expected utility of a von Neumann- 




























































































individual in the society. Rawls, on the other hand, hypothesizes a much less or­
thodox view of behaviour under uncertainty in the original position, which focuses 
upon the person who one would least like to be. This leads to his “difference 
principle.” If one restricts oneself to a utilitarian framework (which Rawls does 
not), this would suggest maximizing the minimum utility level —  i.e., maximin. 
This could conceivably be an acceptable ethical criterion if one lived in a world 
where the only risk is in the original position. Where individual consequences are 
risky, however, rules like maximin violate the independence axiom, as Harsanyi 
(1975a, b, 1977b, 1978) pointed out. In fact, as Lyons (1972), Arrow (1973), Gor­
don (1973), and in particular Barry (1973) have discussed with some care, Rawls’ 
defence of the difference principle is not at all convincing. Harsanyi’s defences of 
his version of the original position are possibly rather better argued, but much 
controversy still surrounds them. For this reason, one of my aims in Hammond 
(1987a) was precisely to avoid any arguments based upon an original position or 
a veil of ignorance. The main idea will now be recapitulated.
Indeed, to go beyond ICUL’s we can follow Harsanyi’s idea of considering 
lotteries to get ICU D ’s as well. Thus let 0  denote the set of all possible individual 
characteristics. Let A(X  x 0 )  denote the set of all simple probability measures 
or lotteries (with finite support) on X  x  0 .  Each measure p in A(X  x 0 )  is 
a finite collection of possible threesomes (xk,6k,Pk) consisting of a social state 
Xk and a personal characteristic 6k, together with the non-negative probability 
Pk that (xk, 6k) will occur. Of course, pt =  1. Suppose that the ethical 
observer imagines himself facing decision trees with random consequences in the 
space A ( X  x 0 )  of such lotteries. Such decision trees include but are not restricted 
to those in which decisions must be taken behind a veil of ignorance. Then, pro­
vided that the observer recommends behaviour which is (with probability one) 
both dynamically consistent in each possible decision tree, and also depends only 
on the consequences of his choices, then he must maximize some preference order­
ing over this space of lotteries which satisfies the independence axiom. If one also 




























































































that all three axioms of Herstein and Milnor (1953) are satisfied (see Hammond, 
1983, 1987a and 1988a, b). Therefore the observer must maximize the expected 
value of some von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function (or NM UF) which I shall 
write as u(x, 8).
Note that the resulting “fundamental” utility function contains within it in­
terpersonal comparisons of both utility levels and utility differences. For the ICUL 
u(x,8i) > u(y,8j) can be taken to mean that the ethical observer prefers to 
be a 0;-person in state x rather than a 0,-person in state y. And the ICUD  
u(x,8i) —  u(y,8i) >  u(z,6j) — u(w,8j)  can be taken to mean that the ethical ob­
server prefers a 50-50 lottery with (x,8i) and (w,8j) as possible outcomes to one 
with (y,6{) and (z,6j) as possible outcomes.
Two special cases deserve to be mentioned. Rawlsian ICUL’s alone emerge 
when one excludes lotteries altogether and simply chooses between sine pairs in 
X  X 0 .  Harsanyi’s ICU D ’s alone emerge when one restricts attention to lotteries in 
which the probabilities of different social states x are independent of the probability 
distribution over 8, and when the latter corresponds to the actual distribution of 
personal characteristics in the population under consideration, as in Harsanyi’s 
version of the original position.
Such impersonal preferences may have a superficial appeal in seeming to fit 
what we perhaps think of when we make ICU’s. The empirical basis of the ICU’s 
which result, however, is not very strong, unless we find a lot of people who are 
used to thinking in this precise impersonal way, and ask them their views. Nor 
are their ethical implications all that clear, since we still have to construct a so­
cial ordering based on such ICU’s, and there are many possibilities, as Roberts 
(1980a, b), Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1984), d’Aspremont (1985) and 
Sen (1986), for instance, have all discussed. This problem is by no means lim­
ited to “impersonal” ICU’s, however, though we may be able to circumvent it by 





























































































5 .1 .  I n t r o d u c t i o n
It would seem empirically ideal if we were able to base IC U ’s on personal 
behaviour. Not surprisingly, therefore, there have been many attempts to do so. 
Yet one can see straight away that this is unlikely to succeed completely, in as 
much as different ethical observers are likely to find different behaviourist criteria 
more appealing.
Let me nevertheless consider some of the behaviourist approaches which have 
been proposed. To do so, it will be convenient to consider two rather different 
aspects of these behaviourist approaches separately. The first concerns the con­
struction of a cardinal utility function to represent each individual’s preferences, 
which is clearly necessary if one is to make ICU D ’s. The second aspect is the 
comparison of different individual’s utility functions as such, once they have been 
cardinalized.
5 .2 .  P r e f e r e n c e  I n t e n s i t i e s
The most common suggestion for cardinalizing individual utility functions 
before comparing their differences interpersonally is to use N M U F’s. These are 
assumed to describe each individual’s personal attitudes towards risk. Relative 
differences of utility are taken as measures of preference intensity for a single 
individual. I have already discussed this procedure at some length in Hammond 
(1982b, 1983, 1987a). I find it more compelling them many other approaches, 
but not all that compelling. Initially, its chief advocates, apart from Harsanyi 
(whose arguments are rather different anyway), were Vickrey (1945, 1960) and 
Jeffrey (1971). Its many critics have included Friedman and Savage (1948, 1952), 
Arrow (1951), Diamond (1967), Sen (1970a, 1973) and, of course, Rawls (1971). A  
general discussion of this and other kinds of intensity approach can also be found 
in Weirich (1983, 1984).
One apparent source of confusion should be cleared up at once. It has been 




























































































nalize is unacceptable when there is no risk, but quite acceptable when there is 
risk. Yet this leads to a discontinuity. If the NM UF caxdinalization is right for 
risky prospects then it is right, presumably, for a sequence of risky prospects which 
converges to a sure prospect. W hy then is this same caxdinalization not right in 
the limit, when we converge to a sure prospect? Instead, I prefer to regard the 
usual NM UF cardinalization as being inappropriate for ICU’s in all situations, be 
they risky or sure.
Of course, even if one accepts the NM UF cardinalization of individual util­
ities, that does not yet make them interpersonally comparable. To do so, Isbell 
(1959) had an ingenious suggestion. To avoid St. Petersburg-like paradoxes, one 
can argue that each individual i must have an NM UF u,- which is bounded both 
above and below. Otherwise, as Menger (1934) and Arrow (1972) showed, there 
axe discontinuities in preferences for some sequence of probability distributions 
which converges in the limit to a distribution which attaches positive probability 
to an infinite sequence of consequences. Then Isbell suggested normalizing each 
individual’s utility function by an affine transformation which puts equal upper 
and lower bounds on all individuals’ utilities —  e.g., a lower bound of 0, and an 
upper bound of 1. Summing normalized utilities then gives a well defined social 
ordering. So does a similar normalization procedure suggested by Schick (1971) 
and criticized by Jeffrey (1974). The ethical appeal of equating different person’s 
upper and lower bounds remains unconvincing, however, at least to me. Consider 
some undemanding person who achieves his upper bound at a low level of con­
sumption. Do we normalize that person’s utility scale so that it has the same upper 
and lower bounds as that of a greedy person? If so, and if we distribute goods 
to each individuals so that each achieves, say, 90% of maximum utility (which is 
now a well defined utility level), then the greedy person is likely to be given much 
more than one feels he deserves.
Most other cardinalizations also rest more or less on some way of trying to infer 
the intensities of an individual’s preferences from personal behaviour. One promi­




























































































worth(1881). It is assumed that each individual has a preference semi-ordering 
of the kind formalized by Luce (1956), in which a transitive indifference relation 
is replaced by an intransitive incomparability relation. Then, under certain ad­
ditional assumptions such as those presented by Suppes and Winet (1955) and 
Kaneko (1984), there exists a utility function U'(-) for each individual i and a 
positive number S' such that
(7) x P ‘ y ■*=>■ U \ x ) - U i{ y ) > S i.
Evidently, such inequalities enable infrapersonal comparisons of utility differences 
and so a cardinalization. Normalizing each individual’s utility function IJ' by mul­
tiplying the function by the constant 1 /S', it can even be arranged that all the 
£” s are equal to one, which Goodman and Markovitz (1952) and more recently 
Ng (1975, 1984b, 1985b) have used to make ICUD’s. Svensson (1985) and others 
have raised obvious objections to adding individuals’ utilities that have been car- 
dinalized in this way. But such ICUD’s themselves are ethically unattractive, as 
Arrow (1963, pp. 115-8) for one has argued. This is because they tend to favour 
the sensitive or those who are most able to complete their indifference map. If we 
think about income distribution impersonally, for instance, do we believe that we 
would value income more if our personal characteristics became those of a person 
who noticed more differences in his utility ranking? And even if we confine our­
selves to intrapersonal comparisons, does it really make sense to value an income 
change half as much just because it moves a person through half as many just 
noticeable differences? The fundamental problem is that the relationship of just 
noticeable differences to idealized ethical decisions is tenuous at best. As Arrow 
also points out, the same is true of Dahl’s (1956) suggestion of using willingness 
to incur enough trouble to vote for x over y as an indication that intensity of 
preference is sufficient to make voting worthwhile.
A  proposal which is somewhat related is to cardinalize utility by looking at 
the probability that the person chooses i  over y. It is assumed, of course, that 




























































































have probabilistic choice models of the kind considered by psychologists such as 
Luce (1959) and reviewed in Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1963) (see Edwards 
and Tversky, 1967) using such probabilities of choice, but over the whole domain 
of options. Intriligator (1973) equated “utilities” with probabilities of choice, in 
effect. A  related suggestion is due to Waldner (1972), who suggests that if possible 
one should construct a utility function for each individual so that the probability 
of choosing x over y is an increasing function of U‘(x) — U‘(y) (e.g., as in a 
probit econometric equation —  see Amemiya, 1981). Alternatively, the “latency” 
of choice —  the time it takes for the person to decide for x over y —  could be 
assumed to be some function of U‘(x) — U'(y). And, in a later paper, Waldner 
(1974a) combines the ideas of probabilistic choice with just noticeable differences 
by looking for “bare preferences” , defined so that “x is barely preferred to y" 
means that x is chosen over y with probability 0.75 (see also Becker 1974 and 
Waldner 1974b).
Now, it may be that we can get a good measure of an individual’s utility by 
the looking at the right hand side exogenous variables of some probit (or logit) 
econometric equation, which is what this kind of procedure would seem to lead to 
eventually. Yet I remain unconvinced. For, bearing in mind that an individual’s 
“utility” should surely be based on idealized choices, I have to ask why such 
superficial irrationalities as imperfect discrimination and the failure to choose the 
best with probability one should have any ethical relevance at all.
5 .3 .  S o c i a l  I n d i c a t o r s
Two entirely different suggestions for cardinalizing individual utilities, as well 
for comparing the cardinalized utilities interpersonally, are contained in the article 
by Simon (1974) —  with comments by Toharia (1978) and a reply by Simon 
(1978) —  and also in the “Leyden” approach of van Praag and his associates —  
see van Praag (1968, 1971), van Praag and Kapteyn (1973), Kapteyn and van 
Praag (1976), Kapteyn (1977), van Herwaarden, Kapteyn and van Praag (1977), 
Tinbergen (1980, 1985, 1987a, b), Hagenaars (1986), van Praag and van der Saar 




























































































Simon lists a number of aspects of individual behaviour which are correlated 
with personal income and so, Simon claims, might be used to construct a measure 
of welfare. They include the propensity to commit suicide on the one hand or 
murder on the other (both negatively correlated with income), statements about 
how happy a person feels, and also different aspects of personal health —  how 
well the person thinks he is, worries, psychological anxiety, severe mental illness, 
etc. Some economic variables which he also considers include a function defining 
the utility of consumption for each time period, which would be a cardinal utility 
function if preferences over consumption streams were additively separable, which 
almost certainly they are not.
A second economic variable Simon considers is labour supply, based on the 
observation by Kindleberger (1965) that hours worked per week in manufacturing 
industry are higher in countries with lower incomes per head. Even as some 
measure of “national” utility, however, this measure seems extremely suspect; as 
a measure of individual utility, it is clearly useless, since it would suggest that the 
unemployed are the best off of all! As for Simon’s other measures, do we really 
want to say that extra money means most to an individual whose propensity to 
commit suicide or to fall ill is thereby most reduced? Or even to say that it means 
most to an identifiable group of individuals whose collective propensity to commit 
suicide or to fall ill is thereby most reduced? And even if we do, what is the 
appropriate cardinalization of utility based on such propensities?
The Leyden approach of van Praag and his associates uses a different tech­
nique. This involves constructing a “social indicator” of well-being —  as discussed 
by sociologists such as Levy and Guttman (1975) or McKennell (1978) —  supple­
mented, however, by explicit interpersonal comparisons of such social indicators. 
The construction is based on the intervals of net family income levels which each 
individual in a sample reports as being necessary to achieve an income which is 
“excellent” , or “good” , or “barely sufficient” , or “bad” —  in fact, they use up to 
nine different quality descriptions. They rank the eight different boundaries be­




























































































probability distribution function to these reports. The result is taken as the “indi­
vidual welfare function of income” . Different types of individuals are characterized 
by the mean and the standard deviation of the distribution of the logarithm of 
income which best fits their reports. They find that the mean is positively related 
to income and to family size, while the standard deviation increases for people 
whose incomes have fluctuated in the past, or whose “social reference group” con­
sists of people with widely differing income levels. Thus, the utility of income 
function for a particular group of people is a smoothing of the function obtained 
by looking at the proportions of people who regard any particular income level as 
“good” , “sufficient” , “bad” , etc. The smoothing occurs, as explained above, by 
fitting a cumulative lognormal distributioi . Reasons for choosing this distribution 
are especially unclear, as Seidl (1987) also points out.
This is an ingenious device very similar to that suggested by Rescher (1967, 
1969) for more general decisions than the choice of income distribution. But it faces 
a number of questions concerning the significance of the findings —  particularly 
their ethical significance. If one only thinks how one would oneself go about 
completing the questionnaire which these researchers used, one begins to realize 
that the survey results must be based on extremely tenuous foundations. The 
questionnaire actually seems harder to fill in, moreover, when one realizes that 
the results will be used to construct a cardinalized utility function in order to 
decide what is an appropriate income distribution. Unless, that is, one has some 
confidence already in what is the right cardinalization. The approach also faces 
considerable problems when one tries, as van Praag (1968) and also Kapteyn 
(1977) indeed did, to go beyond a purely one good framework and allow different 
consumers to have different tastes for many consumption goods. If there were 
public goods as well, the method would be very stretched indeed.
It therefore seems to me that there has not yet emerged any thoroughly sat­
isfactory behaviourist approach to cardinalizing individual utility functions. The 
fact that so many different approaches have been tried, all of which have some 




























































































overcome “Hume’s Law” , which claims that one cannot derive an “ought” from 
an “is” . Indeed, in Hume’s own words:
In every system o f  morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that 
the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way o f  reasoning, and establishes the 
being o f  a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when o f  a sudden I am 
surpriz’d to find, that instead o f  the usual copulations o f  propositions, is, and in not, I meet 
with no proposition that is not connected with an might, or an ought not. This change is 
imperceptible; but is, however, o f  the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, 
expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and 
explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether 
inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely 
different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to 
recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou 'd subvert all 
the vulgar systems o f  morality, and let us see, that the distinction o f  vice and virtue is not 
founded merely on the relations o f  objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason.
— HUME (1739-40; 1969, p. 521).
As Hume foresaw, there is just no way we can use empirical observations on 
their own to produce an ethically satisfactory cardinalization, let alone an ethically 
satisfactory social welfare ordering. As Samuelson (1937, p. 161) put it more than 
fifty years ago:
in conclusion, any connection between utility as discussed here and any welfare concept 
is disavowed. The idea that the results o f  such a statistical investigation could have any 
influence upon ethical judgment o f  policy is one which deserves the impatience o f  modem 
economists.
5 .4 .  F u n d a m e n t a l  P r e f e r e n c e s  a n d  I s o m o r p h y  
All men are bom  equal: it’s their habits that make them different.
— (attributed to Confucius).
The idea that, deep down, we are really all alike, is rather an old one in 
moral philosophy. And it would be helpful particularly in making interpersonal 
comparisons of utility levels if there were a universally accepted preference ordering 
on the space which everybody shares. Then the comparison ( i ,6\) R (y,62) would 
mean that everybody weakly prefers being in state x with characteristics 0, to 
being in state y with characteristics 82. Among economists, an ordering of this 
kind has been postulated by Tinbergen (1957) and Kolm (1972). Under standard 




























































































made. The utility still needs cardinalization, however, if we are to compare utility 
differences as well. This is what Harsanyi (1955) tried to provide.
Such “fundamental preferences,” as Kolm calls them, make especial sense 
when we recognize that individuals do not have fixed characteristics, and so find 
themselves choosing what characteristics to have as well as making the usual eco­
nomic and other decisions. This is the topic of Section 5.5 below. Unfortunately, it 
is by no means clear why a universally accepted interpersonal preference ordering 
should emerge, as MacKay (1986), for one, discusses.
An alternative rather less general approach is that of “isomorphy” , to use 
Mirrlees’ (1982) term. A general formulation of this principle is found in Arrow 
(1977); it is related to the Gorman (1956, 1980) and Lancaster (1966) “charac­
teristics” approach to consumer demand theory. A similar approach is also used 
by Stigler and Becker (1977) to construct what is in effect a fundamental utility 
function shared by all, though they do not care to use the function to make in­
terpersonal comparisons. There is a space Z of “characteristics” such that, for 
each consequence y in Y and each individual i in N, there is a characteristic vec­
tor Gi(y) in Z which describes the effect of y on i. Each z in Z is supposed to 
include not only Gorman-Lancaster characteristics but, in some cases, tastes too 
(Arrow, 1977). Then there is a utility function u on Z which is the same for each 
individual. A  similar but simpler version is discussed by Mirrlees (1982), who 
assumes that individuals differ only in their skill level n, and that each individual 
has the same utility function u(x, y/n) where x is consumption and y is output in 
efficiency units from the labour which the individual supplies. Yet another kind 
of “isomorphy” arises in connection with family equivalence scales. These were as 
introduced by Barten (1964), then used by Muellbauer (1974a, b, c, 1975, 1977) 
especially in order to make interfamily comparisons of utility levels. Such com­
parisons have been criticized by Poliak and Wales (1979) —  see also Muellbauer 
(1987), Blackorby and Donaldson (1987). For these family equivalence scales it 
is assumed that each household has a utility function for consumption vectors 




























































































of good g, and mg is a scaling factor for good g which depends on family com­
position. These scaling factors can be derived from demand data, since each 
household’s demand for good g at given prices and incomes can be expressed as 
mg h*g(pi m  1 , P2 m 2 , . . .  ,pn m n; / ) ,  where I  denotes income. This is a very special 
functional form, however, and although some generalizations are possible, they 
only permit inferences about the form of u for different households to be made in 
exceptional cases.
Yet the main objection to these approaches is rather different. It is simply 
that, if we measure utility interpersonally by u(x,y/n) in the Mirrlees model, we 
neglect the possibility that being more skilled actually confers extra utility in its 
own right. Any class of utility functions of the form
(8) u(n,x,y/n) =  <l>(n,u(x,y/n)),
with 1j>(n, •) increasing in u for each fixed n, produces identical utility maximizing 
demand and supply behaviour, but usually very different interpersonal compar­
isons. Similarly, in the model with household composition effects, if we measure 
utility interfamilially by u(x\/m\, x2/ m 2, . . . ,  Then, as Poliak and Wales
(1979), Deaton and Muellbauer (1986), and Fisher (1987) have all pointed out, we 
neglect the possibility that a household with more children may be better off just 
because it has more children, even if it consumes an equivalent bundle of goods 
to a household with no children or fewer children. Indeed, any class of utility 
functions of the form
(9)
“ (m i , m 2, . . . , m B; * 1, x 2, . . . , z n) =  %!> I mu m 2, . . . ,  m„ ;  u( — , — , . . . , — ) ) ,
V mi m 2 m „  )
where ^ ( m i ,  m 2, . . . ,  m n, •) is increasing in u for each fixed m 1 , m 2, . . . ,  m n, gen­
erates identical utility maximizing demands for commodities, but usually very 
different interfamily comparisons. The postulate of isomorphy in this simple form 
forces us to neglect such possibilities altogether. In the more general Arrow (1977) 
approach, however, we can include things like skill and children as characteristics 




























































































It has been suggested that simple isomorphy may be recoverable if we consider 
the choice of family size and of household composition within a utility maximizing 
framework, or the choice of skill level when this results from decisions concerning 
education. But even if one believes in utility maximization as strongly as does 
Becker (1981) when it comes to “human capital” or family composition decisions, 
it is far from clear that the appropriate utility function is being maximized. Family 
composition is chosen for reasons which are not purely self-interested —  or at least 
one hopes this is usually the case. And the choice of how skilled one wants to be is a 
difficult one to make according to usual expected utility maximizing criteria, since 
it is virtually impossible to appreciate all the possible consequences of acquiring 
skills without actually acquiring them.
It seems that to make isomorphy a basis for ICUL’s requires doing as Arrow 
(1977) suggests and including lots of extraneous variables. Then, however, we have 
gone beyond a purely behaviourist, model because many of the extraneous vari­
ables will be inherited or exogenous rather than consequences of the individual’s 
own behaviour. We have virtually reverted to “fundamental preferences” . And, as 
I remarked before, such preferences are unlikely to be observable. Little is gained, 
it seems, by considering preferences under isomorphy instead of fundamental pref­
erences, which they closely resemble.
5 .5 .  I n t r a p e r s o n a l  C o m p a r i s o n s
Recently, Gibbard (1986, 1987) has pursued an idea which had earlier been 
developed by Harsanyi (1955, and 1977a, p. 59) and Jeffrey (1971). This suggests 
basing the notional IC U ’s which ethical theory seems to require upon the infra­
personal comparisons of utility which many of us find ourselves implicitly making 
throughout our lives. Similar ideas are also considered by Griffin (1987), Broome 
(1988) and many others. After all, the argument goes, we are confronted many 
times with opportunities to make decisions which affect our personal characteris­
tics, including our tastes, habits, predilections, etc. Implicitly, at least, any such 
decision involves comparing different potential personal characteristics. It hap­




























































































that make any difference? Thus, this approach supplies us with the beginnings 
of a theory which is based on actual preferences. Two serious problems remain, 
however, both of which Gibbaxd for one readily admits. In fact Gibbard even uses 
these problems as arguments why one should be sceptical about the possibility of 
basing an individual welfare function on mirapersonal comparisons, let alone the 
possibility of basing a social welfare function on interpersonal comparisons.
The first difficulty, which is more obvious, is that any given individual —  par­
ticularly a mature adult to whose preferences we might want to give much more 
weight than to those of a child —  is only likely to face choices between a rather lim­
ited range of different possible personal characteristics. Somebody who does not 
learn in youth a particular kind of skill like mathematics, foreign languages, ability 
with a particular musical instrument, or in gymnastics or ball games, will find it 
much harder to achieve real mastery of the skill later on in life. Some personal 
characteristics are virtually impossible to change, such as one’s genetic inheri­
tance. Indeed, how does one completely forget one’s unbringing? So the range 
of interpersonal comparisons of utility which can be inferred from such practical 
intrapersonal comparisons of utility is unfortunately rather limited. Ortuno-Ortin 
and Roemer (1987) have an interesting suggestion for piecing together local intrap­
ersonal comparisons into a global intrapersonal welfare function, but it depends 
on assumptions which may limit its applicability too severely.
The second difficulty with this theory relates to the general issue of whether it 
is right to infer how to make ethical decisions from individual’s actual preferences. 
In economics the “consumer sovereignty” value judgement states that the goods 
and services which an individual wants to buy enhance that individual’s welfare 
and so are ethically desirable. As Lerner (1972) put it:
As a social critic, I may try to change some desires to others of which I approve more, but 
as an economist I must be concerned with the mechanisms for getting people what they 
want, no matter how these wants are acquired.
— Lerner (1972, p. 258).
Many economists accept this value judgement so unquestioningly that they 




























































































reveal a preference for becoming addicted to certain drugs, most people —  even 
most economists —  generally reject consumer sovereignty. Such self-destructive 
behaviour is clearly just one extreme instance of the general possibility noticed 
by Harsanyi (1953a) and Poliak (1976), for instance, that people do not always 
make ethically appropriate intrapersonal comparisons of utility, because they wind 
up acquiring inappropriate personal characteristics. So it is doubtful whether 
individual behaviour can be relied on to reveal fundamental preferences, partly 
because the relevant characteristics include tastes which themselves have to be 
inferred from behaviour, and partly because individuals will usually be too myopic 
to maximize consistently any such fundamental preferences.
Of course, Harsanyi also claimed to be using intrapersonal comparisons. His 
approach rests on “the postulate that the preferences and utility functions of all 
human individuals are governed by the same basic psychological laws,” (Harsanyi, 
1975b, p. 600). But, unlike the theory just enunciated, Harsanyi allows compar­
isons to extend to all “hypothetical conditions” in which a person has a different 
characteristic. Some such “hypothetical conditions” could never be met in prac­
tice; an individual cannot become a younger person, for instance, or have different 
natural parents. For this reason, I prefer to regard Harsanyi as postulating a 
fundamental utility function.
6. Interpersonal Comparisons and Ethical Decisions
6 .1 .  T h e  D i r e c t  A p p r o a c h  t o  S o c i a l  W e l f a r e  M e a s u r e m e n t
The attempt to base ethically relevant ICU’s upon empirical observations, 
particularly observations of behaviour, has not surprisingly rim into Hume’s Law 
which claims that normative statements cannot rest upon purely empirical foun­
dations. The only alternative is to recognize from the start that ethically relevant 
ICU’s are bound to depend upon ethical value judgements, at least in part, and 
so will almost certainly also have to be subjective. Indeed, even intrapersonal 
comparisons, and the construction of an ethically relevant individual welfare func­




























































































system of ethical standards which is not largely subjective, at least when we try 
to come up with as precise a system as that implied by a social welfare ordering.
Once we recognize that such ICU’s are bound to be subjective, and so that 
any derived social welfare ordering is bound to be subjective, there is much to 
be said for looking directly at the ordering itself. This is particularly true in 
economic contexts, where the issue of how to trade off total real income against 
inequality of real income may even suffice to determine a social welfare function 
—  cf. Atkinson (1970), and Sen’s (1978) criticism of inequality measures. This 
is the direct approach to social welfare measurement. It is, of course, the one 
which Bergson (1938) and many others have adopted, at least implicitly. Such an 
approach typically relies on ICU’s because otherwise we would have a dictatorship 
(see Roberts, 1980c, and the papers cited therein, as well as Kemp and Ng, 1987). 
But if it is easier to think what is a good social welfare ordering, rather than 
how to make ICU’s, why should we not start with the ordering and have it reveal 
the IC U ’s, instead of starting with ICU’s and trying to derive a social ordering? 
Especially if it is not at all clear anyway how to incorporate ICU’s into a social 
ordering even if we believe we have made securely founded and ethically relevant 
interpersonal comparisons of both utility levels and utility differences. This direct 
approach is well exemplified by the experiments of Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) 
and of Schokkaert and Overlaet (1989). It is also advocated in the conclusion of 
Kaneko (1984).
6.2. Can Interpersonal Com parisons Have Ethical Significance?
The direct approach to distributional judgements, however, essentially only 
masks the key question: what ethical significance can we attach to the implicit 
ICU’s, if any (cf. Sen, 1979)? To summarize, as pointed out by Rothenburg (1961, 
pp. 268 -9), most existing treatments of ICU’s consider only hypothetical decisions 
requiring that individuals imagine themselves becoming other individuals. The 





























































































How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, 
which interest him in the fortune o f  others, and render their happiness necessary to him, 
though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure o f  seeing it. O f this kind is pity or 
compassion, which we feel for the misery o f  others, when we either see it, or are made to 
conceive it in a very lively manner . . .
That this is the source o f  our fellow feeling for the misery o f  others, that it is by 
changing places in fancy with the sufferer, that we come either to conceive or to be affected 
by what he feels, may be demonstrated by many observations, if  it should not be thought 
sufficiently evident o f  itself.
—  S m it h  (1759), pp. 1-3.
Harsanyi (1977a, fn. 4, p. 293) seeks to rebut Rothenburg’s argument that 
ICU’s depend on “changing places” in this way. Indeed, the transition from being 
nobody in particular in an original position, to a particular person later on, really 
is different. But there is a sense in which person A becomes B as the result of 
two transitions: first, back from being A to the original position; second, forward 
from the original position to being B. In any case, the ethical relevance of such 
original position arguments remains controversial.
Indeed, the reason for not allowing ICU’s which Arrow offered in Social Choice 
and Individual Values, as quoted at the end of Section 2, was recently repeated 
somewhat more forcefully:
Interpersonal comparisons o f  utility cannot be given decision-theoretic significance. That 
is, there is no decision-theoretic meaning for a statement such as, ‘ a movie gives me more 
utility than an opera gives you ,’ because neither o f  us could ever be forced to choose 
between being me at a movie and you at an opera.
—  M y e r s o n  (1 9 8 5 , p p . 2 3 8 -9 ).
The real trouble with most existing approaches to ICU’s is precisely the failure 
to integrate them properly within a comprehansive framework based on ethically 
relevant decisions. People cannot change places, or be put into an original posi­
tion. Information regarding utility comparisons cannot just be postulated, without 
explaining what decisions it explains or relates to.
Sen (1970a, b) and many succeeding articles published during the 1970’s in­
corporate ICU’s in formal social choice theory in a different way. But that work 
mostly treated ICU’s as additional information which merely places restrictions 




























































































required to leave the social decision norm unchanged. No practical procedure for 
making such IC U ’s were suggested. In Sen’s approach, IC U ’s were not directly 
related to any ethical decisions which could possibly arise in practice.
The time has come to see what is possible when interpersonal comparisons 
are explicitly related to choices of people.
6.3. Interpersonal Com parisons Revealed by Choice o f  People
There are certainly many real life decisions which do involve genuine interper­
sonal comparisons, if not always interpersonal comparisons of utility. W e choose 
people as spouses, friends, colleagues, employees, employers, landlords, tenants, 
doctors, lawyers, investment advisers, members of our sports teams or social clubs. 
Doctors choose people as candidates for organ transplants. Immigration officers 
choose people, or reject them, as do governments with the power to withhold 
exit visas. To a certain extent, even conference organizers and participants choose 
each other, as do writers and their readers. The opening two sentences of Harsanyi 
(1987b) recognize this:
Suppose I am left with a ticket to a Mozart concert I am unable to attend and decide to 
give it to one of my closest friends. Which friend should I actually give it to?
Indeed, consider the choice between person i at a film and person j  at an opera, 
which Myerson claimed could not be given decision-theoretic meaning. Myerson 
was right that it may be hard for a film enthusiast like i to imagine becoming 
an opera-lover like j , or for person j  to imagine becoming somebody like i who 
prefers the cinema to the opera. And he was right that this is exactly the kind of 
comparison which virtually all existing work on ICU’s would have us contemplate. 
Yet other much more meaningful comparisons by third parties are certainly possi­
ble, even between film- and opera-goers. A municipal authority, for example, may 
be contemplating whether to use a certain piece of land or an existing building 
for either a cinema or an opera house —  it is then involved in rather direct inter­
personal comparisons between having more people in the city who see more films, 
or more people who see more opera. A private profit-maximizing entertainment 




























































































profits they are expected to generate, which is even a quantitative interpersonal 
comparison.
At first it might seem that such choices of people have no bearing on our prob­
lem of making interpersonal comparisons of utility. One chooses friends mostly 
for the value of their friendship, not because of their individual utility. Yet, in a 
sense, friends are being chosen precisely for their utility as friends to the person 
choosing to befriend them. Interpersonal comparisons of this utility as friends are 
being revealed by the choice of one’s friends, according to this view. The enter­
tainment company, or any other profit-maximizing company, attaches a measure 
of “utility” to each customer equal to the profit which that customer is expected 
to generate. Of course, these are person. 1 preferences and personal measures of 
utility, which need not necessarily have any ethical significance.
6.4. The Utilities o f  Persons to  Society
The ethical interpersonal comparisons of utility that are hidden in the ideal­
ized version of Harsanyi’s utilitarianism are actually rather similar to those just 
discussed. They represent, in a sense, preferences regarding the kinds of people 
which it is desirable to have in the society. An ethical interpersonally comparable 
utility function measures an ethical observer’s view of the utility of a person to the 
society as a whole. Moroever, the utility of a person can change along with that 
person’s circumstances, such as income or social status. Indeed, it could happen 
that this measure of the utility of a person increases if and only if the person moves 
to situations which he himself prefers, although this is by no means necessary.
To understand this approach properly requires examining carefully the pre­
cise form which idealized or “fundamental” utilitarianism takes. As explained in 
Hammond (1987a, 1988c), it requires choosing among the feasible probability dis­
tributions over possible values of (x, 6M , M) in order to maximize the expected 
value of the welfare sum
( i o )  w ( x , e M , M )  =  ^ M v(x , e i ).




























































































social state (or economic allocation), 8 M denotes the profile m , where
denotes individual i ’s personal characteristics, which determine tastes, values, etc., 
and v denotes the common fundamental NM UF. This is just (the expected value 
of) the total utility objective of classical utilitarianism, but with a very different 
concept of an individual’s “utility.”
As Yaari (1981) points out, Edgeworth (1881, p. 117) dismissed what Hutch­
eson called “the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers” as meaningless, like 
“greatest illumination with the greatest number of lamps.” But Yaari’s argument 
(p. 17) that, maximization of (10) is “meaningless” is at best incomplete. Because 
the special form of distribution problem he considers places no natural limit on 
numbers of individuals, the maximand can indeed become arbitrarily large. An  
analogy is that the consumer’s utility function in neoclassical demand theory may 
also be made arbitrarily large, unless it happens to be bounded above. Realisti­
cally, however, the set of feasible intertemporal population streams is bounded, 
for any finite time horizon. This also disposes of G. Dworkin’s (1982) (apparently 
deliberately frivolous) rejection of utilitarianism, which is very similar to Yaari’s. 
Anyway, one is usually choosing among a small number of different feasible policies 
affecting both population and resource allocation. Yaari’s ingenious reformulation 
of classical utilitarianism therefore strikes me as being neither necessary nor con­
vincing. Other objections to this population objective are discussed, for instance, 
in Dasgupta (1988), Hammond (1988c), the work cited in those papers, and also 
Schwartz (1979). None seems to me very persuasive when the welfare objective
( 10 ) is properly understood.
Implicit in (10) are at least three different types of ICU’s, all of which have 
received considerable attention in the past. Now, in addition, they will be related 
to hypothetical ethical choices of potential persons, as befits ethical IC U ’s.
First, one has level comparisons of utility of the form
(11) »(xi,0j) > v(x2,()j).




























































































place an individual i in situation (x i,# ;)  with the same or another individual j  in 
situation (x2,0j),  then that would be a desirable change, ceteris paribus.
Second, one has difference comparisons of utility of the typical form
( 1 2 )  v(xlt0i) -  v(x2, 0 j )  >  v(x3,6k) -  v(xi ,9e).
This can be interpreted as meaning that, if it were possible to have an increase 
in the probability of replacing an individual i in situation ( x i ,0;) with another 
individual j  in situation {x2, 8 j )  which is exactly equal to the decrease in the 
probability of replacing an individual k in situation (X3, 9k) with another individual 
£ in situation (x4, 9(), then that would be a desirable change, ceteris paribus.
The third kind of comparison is of an individual’s utility level with zero, and 
it takes one of the two alternative forms
(13) v(x ,9 i)> 0  
or
(14) . v(x', 8j) <  0.
The typical comparison (13) has the obvious meaning that, if it were possible to 
replace a society in which individual i will never exist with another society in which 
individual i will exist and be in situation (x ,# ,) , then that would be a desirable 
change, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, the reverse typical comparison (14) 
has the obvious meaning that, if it were possible to replace a society in which 
individual j  will exist and be in situation (x ',8j) with another society in which j 
will never exist, then that would also be a desirable change, ceteris paribus.
These interpretations of the three kinds of comparison which have received 
most attention in the past are rather obvious, given that one accepts the desirabil­
ity of the utilitarian welfare objective ( 10 ) for all kinds of policy decision, including 
those that affect the future numbers of individuals in the society, as well as the 




























































































6.5. Utility R atios as M arginal Rates o f  Substitution
In fact, once we allow the possibility of grouping individuals into one of several 
categories of “ethically identical” individuals, the fundamental utility function 
can be given another interpretation which should be familiar to economists. For, 
if N(x,0) denotes the number of individuals who have personal characteristic 6 
when the social state is x , then ( 10 ) can be written as
(15) W(x, 8m ,M ) =  w (* , *) V(s,») =  V (N (* , ■))■
Here V ( N ( i ,  •)) is a linear function of the vector N  with components N(x, 0) (all 
0 6 0 ) .  Then (15) says that the social ordering should have linear indifference 
curves in the space of possible vectors N , with constant marginal rates of substi­
tution v(x,8)/v(x,8') between the numbers of individuals with any pair 8,9' of 
personal characteristics. Such constant marginal rates of substitution determine, 
for each fixed x, an interpersonally comparable utility function v(x, •) on the do­
main of possible values of 9. This function is unique up to cardinal ratio scale 
transformations of the form
(16) v(x, 9) =  a(x) v(x, 8)
for any a(x) >  0 which is independent of 8. This implies that the entire funda­
mental utility function v(x, 9) can be constructed by combining:
(i) any one type of individual’s von Neumann-Morgenstem utility function v(-, 8) 
defined on all social states x, whose expected value represents the utility to 
society of a 0-person for any given lottery over such social states;
(ii) the unique marginal rates of substitution v(x,9)/v(x,6) between 0-persons 
and 0-persons in each social state x.
The result is a function v(x, 8) which is unique up to ratio-scale transformations 
of the forms




























































































where now a >  0 is also independent of x.
Take the specific case where x =  y(-), an income distribution function y(0) 
defined for all types of individual 0, and where each individual’s welfare becomes 
just w (y(0)), a function of just own income. Then equation (15) becomes
(is ) ^ W - ) )  =  5 Z  n( y ) w(y)‘—‘ y
where n(y) is the number of individuals who share income level y. Then the inter- 
personally comparable utility of income function w(y) is simply determined from 
marginal rates of substitution between numbers of people with different incomes. 
Notice that w(y) could be negative for some values of y. Nor is there any pre­
sumption yet that w is increasing in y, though that is probably a restriction which 
one’s ethics would imply —  the utility to a society of richer people exceeds that 
of poorer.
Finally, it is tempting to explore the implications of assuming that a function 
like (18) represents a nation’s preferences not only over income distributions but 
also over immigration policies. For then the ratios w(y)/w(y') represent marginal 
rates of substitution between immigrants (and existing residents too, indiscrimi­
nately) of different earning capacities. If immigration policy is then insensitive to 
earning capacity beyond a certain threshold y, that would imply that the marginal 
utility of income drops to zero, for y > y\ On the other hand, if immigrants with 
income y below some lower limit y_ are regarded as undesirable —  i.e., w(y) <  0 for 
all y <  y  —  that tends to suggest that there may be exceptional benefits from rais­
ing the incomes of existing poor residents to at least y. It also suggests, of course, 
that society would be better off if it could prevent the birth of individuals with 
incomes below y. No doubt the function (20) is far too simplistic for discussing 
immigration or population policy, even assuming that objectives are limited to na­
tional rather than world welfare, that only the distribution of income is ethically 
relevant, and that immigrants are treated on the same basis as nationals. Yet it 
does illustrate some of the possibilities which begin to emerge from integrating the 




























































































Despite the promise of such an approach, there has been a remarkable reluc­
tance, apparently, to try to relate the ICU’s which utilitarian ethical theory needs 
to explicit decisions of this kind. That may well be because we feel uncomfortable 
when confronted with such decisions, since they tend to remind us of the evils of 
Hitler’s Mein Kampf which were put into practice, or those of Aldous Huxley’s 
Brave New World which have not been as yet. But then any all-encompassing 
ethical theory of this kind is bound to embrace many different possible values, 
some of which may be extremely unethical. It seems to me high time that the 
ethical issues regarding the choice of persons should be confronted more openly 
and honestly.
7. Summary o f  W here We Stand
Needless to say I do not at all deny that, in the course o f  evolution o f  econom ics as we 
know it, there has been a good deal o f  intermixture o f  political and ethical discussion 
with the scientific discussion o f  fact and possibility. I shall shortly be discussing this 
matter further in the light o f  certain specific instances; and it will not appear that, provided 
the, logical difference between the. two kinds o f propositions is clearly kept in mind, I am 
in the least hostile to the combination. In that youthful book o f  mine which evoked such 
fervid denunciation, I expressly denied that my position involved the view that ‘ economists 
should not discuss ethical or political questions any more than the position that botany is 
not aesthetics means that botanists should not have views on the layout o f  gardens.’ On 
the contrary I went on to argue, ‘ it is greatly to be desired that economists should have 
speculated long and widely on these matters.’ As you will see later on, my position today 
only involves a slight purely semantic modification o f  this pronouncement. I still hold that 
the distinction o f  the different kinds o f  propositions is inescapable and that w e run the 
dangers o f  intellectual confusion on our own part and justifiable criticism from outside if 
we do not explictly recognize it.
—  R o b b i n s  (1 9 8 1 , p . 4 )
Interpersonal comparisons of utility (ICU’s) have to be made if there is to be 
any satisfactory escape from Arrow’s impossibility theorem, with its implication 
that individualistic social choice has to be dictatorial (or at least oligarchic), or else 
that is has to restrict itself to recommending Pareto improvements. Even dicta­
torship, in fact, embodies interpersonal comparisons in the choice of the dictator, 
as do oligarchies in their choice of the oligarchs.
ICU’s can be comparisons of utility levels or of utility differences, but even af­




























































































be incorporated into a social welfare functional (cf. Roberts, 1980a, b; Blackorby, 
Donaldson and Weymark, 1984; and d’Aspremont, 1985). Nor have existing at­
tempts to derive ICU’s from imaginary decisions behind a veil of ignorance, or 
from preferences about the type of person one might wish to become, or from in­
dividual behaviour, yet yielded anything sufficiently definite and specific to apply 
to a broad class of ethical decision problems. It is true that, for some purposes, one 
could circumvent the problem just by specifying what seems an ethically attrac­
tive Bergson social welfare function, based on a fundamental form of Harsanyi’s 
utilitarianism, and letting ICU’s emerge from the analysis. Yet this would seem 
to be unnecessarily evasive.
These considerations then suggest the need to consider the relationship be­
tween ICU’s and explicit ethical choices regarding numbers of different types of 
people in the population. The result is an enriched social choice theory, capable 
of handling a broader range of ethical decision problems, in which the ICU’s axe 
explicit and play a clear role in the analysis. Utility becomes determined up to 
a cardinal ratio scale, with zero signifying the level at which society is indifferent 
between creating that type of person as a new member and not. Utility ratios are 
marginal rates of substitution between numbers of differents types of people.
The primary content of all such ICU’s, however, is entirely ethical. Indeed, 
even the primary content of the utility or individual welfare functions which are 
being compared interpersonally must be entirely ethical, since such functions repre­
sent the relative ethical desirability of different decisions which affect only one indi­
vidual. Empirical evidence can be of great relevance, but judgements of what sort 
of empirical evidence bears on the question of how to construct a fully comparable 
fundamental utility function, as required by the kind of extension of Harsanyi’s 
theory which I am contemplating, are inevitably ethical value judgements. Hume’s 
Law refuses to release its iron grip. The empirical content of the fundamental in­
terpersonally comparable utility function is precisely the empirical content of the 
utilitarian ethical theory based on maximizing the expected sum of this utility 




























































































In a sense, we have gone back to the “fundamental preferences” considered in
Section 4 above. The difference is that these preferences need not be derived from
individuals’ “impersonal preferences” in some kind of original position, behind a
veil of ignorance. Instead they are based on the values of the ethical observer, as
influenced by that observer’s understanding of the individual’s psychology and the
observer’s view of how society benefits from creating that individual or changing
the individual’s situation. As Scanlon (1987) suggests, we need
to construct a more concrete conception o f  welfare in terms o f  particular goods and con ­
ditions generally recognized as important to a good life even by people with divergent 
values.
Similar ideas receive extensive discussion in Sen (1980, 1984, 1985, 1987b), Griffin 
(1986, 1987), etc.
To repeat, ethical ICU’s really do require that an individual’s utility be the 
ethical utility or worth of that individual to the society.
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